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BETTER BABY BUSINESS. MINN.

Building a Better Baby Business
Debora Spar* & Anna M. Harrington**
Thirty years ago, Louise Brown’s 1978 birth1 ushered in a
new era of reproductive technology. The first baby born via in
vitro fertilization (“IVF”), mixing eggs and sperm in a test tube,
promised hope to millions desperate to conceive. Yet along
with the promise came dilemmas about just how far one should
go to have a child. Heather Higgins, for example, lost track of
the number of IVF cycles she had undergone at twenty-eight
years of age and twenty-one cycles.2 Roberta Kraft was
$38,700 in debt after spending everything she had and
borrowing more trying to get pregnant.3 Nkem Chukwu gave
birth to the world’s first octuplets in 1998 as a result of fertility
drugs,4 though the fifth and smallest died.5 Pregnant fifty-oneyear-old Sophia hoped to join a hundred other women who had
become mothers over the age of fifty, including Arceli Keh, the
oldest reported woman to give birth to a child at age sixtythree.6 Samantha Carolan received $7,000 to donate her eggs
the first time at age twenty-three, and $8,000 the second time,
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*Debora Spar is author of The Baby Business: How Money, Science and
Politics Drive the Commerce of Conception and President of Barnard College.
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NEWS,
1. First
‘Test
Tube
Baby’
Born,
BBC
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/25/newsid_2499000/24994
11.stm (last visited Sept. 26, 2008).
2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, For the Infertile, a High-Tech Treadmill, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1997, § 1, at 36.
3. Esther B. Fein, Calling Infertility a Disease, Couples Battle with
Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, § 1, at 1.
4. See Americas Octuplet Baby Dies, BBC NEWS, Dec. 27, 1998,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/243155.stm.
5. Lawrence K. Altman, Smallest Octuplet Dies; Others Remain Critical,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1998, at A18.
6. Lisa Belkin, Pregnant with Complications, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 33–36.
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using the money to pay off her student loans.7 She planned to
donate again.8 Geraldine Wesolowski, age fifty-three, gave
birth to her child and grandchild, conceived from her son’s
sperm and his infertile wife’s eggs.9 Augusta Roman was told
by a Texas court that her three frozen embryos, created with
her ex-husband Randy, would have to be destroyed.10 Danielle
Pagano, age sixteen, desperate to know her origins, placed an
advertisement on Donor Sibling Registry, a website that
facilitates connections between the parents and offspring of
assisted reproduction: “Hello, I’m Your Sister. Our Father Is
Donor 150.”11
These are all true stories, plucked from dozens like them
that litter the pages of newspapers, magazines, and books.
They are all stories about the modern marvels of reproductive
technology, but also, more subtly, about the failure to establish
rules governing what has become a sizeable industry in the
United States and abroad. This article attempts to describe
how lawmakers can fill that gap to ensure quality and equity in
the reproductive technology industry. It argues for curbing the
excesses and unfairness inherent in a market that offers some
people their only hope of a genetically related child. This
article covers four broad topics: a survey of the market for
assisted reproduction, or what is termed “the baby business;”12
an overview of the problems emanating from this market; an
argument about the relative lack of regulation in this area; and
an examination of various regulatory and public policy
approaches that could lead to a substantially better baby
business.
I. THE MARKET FOR ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: THE
7. Roni Caryn Rabin, As Demand for Donor Eggs Soars, High Prices Stir
Ethical Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2007, at F6.
8. See id.
9. See Lindsey Gruson, When ‘Mom’ and ‘Grandma’ are One and the
Same, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1993, at B1.
10. Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 54–55 (Tex. App. 2006) (upholding
an agreement between a couple providing for discarding their unused embryos
in the event of a divorce); see also Court Won’t Hear Battle Over Embryos, N.Y.
TIMES (late edition), Aug. 26, 2007, at A20.
11. Amy Harmon, Hello, I’m Your Sister. Our Father is Donor 150., N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2005, § 1, at 1.
12. See generally DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY,
SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION (2006)
(describing how assisted reproduction has become a market driven industry).
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“BABY BUSINESS”
Assisted reproductive technology (“ART”) is one of the few
markets in the world in which products and services are
regularly exchanged for money—often very large amounts of
money—where buyers and sellers on both sides of the exchange
remain loath to acknowledge that they are engaged in a
commercial transaction.13 Such reluctance is understandable.
First, there is an institutional taboo against recognizing the
commercial nature of the baby business.
Despite the
flourishing market we describe below, the sale of reproductive
components is technically forbidden in some states and frowned
upon by professional organizations.14 Second, on a more
personal and compelling level, most babies are clearly
“produced” outside the market—in the bedroom, for free, a
product of love and not money. It is only for a small number of
would-be producers that babies cost money.15 Those who
venture into the baby business, therefore, have good reason not
to want to acknowledge the commercial side of their action:
they, unlike most of their peers, cannot or choose not to produce
a baby for free. Yet regardless of the language used or
preferred, employing ART involves both commercial
13. See id. at xiv; Claudia Dreifus, An Economist Examines the Business
of Fertility: A Conversation with Debora Spar, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at
F5.
14. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-5-3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) (making it
a Class C Felony when a person “knowingly or intentionally purchases or sells
a human ovum, zygote, embryo, or fetus,” but providing exceptions for
reimbursement for lost earnings, travel expenses, medical or hospital
expenses, as well as recovery time compensation of up to $3,000 for IVF,
gamete intrafallopian transfer, or zygote intrafallopian transfer); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (2008) (“The sale of a human ovum, fertilized human
ovum, or human embryo is expressly prohibited.”); see Ethics Committee of the
American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Financial Compensation of
Oocyte Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 306 (2007) [hereinafter ASRM
Guidelines for Oocyte Donor Compensation]:
As the Ethics Committee explains: Another ethical concern is that
payment for oocytes implies that they are property or commodities,
and thus devalues human life. Many people believe that payment to
individuals for reproductive and other tissues is inconsistent with
maintaining important values related to respect for human life and
dignity. This view is reflected in state and federal laws prohibiting
direct payment to individuals providing organs and tissues for
transplantation.
See generally NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STEM CELL RESEARCH
(2008),
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/embfet.htm
(summarizing state laws regarding the use of human eggs and embryos).
15. See SPAR, supra note 12, at 1.
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transactions and social effects. If we are to govern these
transactions and effects as well as we should, we need to
acknowledge that the market exists and understand how it
works.
A. THE DEMAND SIDE
Currently, the demand side of the baby business comprises
a wide variety of people, including infertile couples
(approximately 15% of women and 10-15% of men),16 same sex
couples, genetically-at-risk couples or individuals,17 single
parents, gender selectors,18 and fertile adopters. Interestingly,
demand has remained high despite high costs19 and is likely
responsible for pushing prices even higher.20 In economic
terms, demand can be considered relatively inelastic because
many people determined to have a child who is genetically
related to them are willing to pay whatever it takes (or
whatever they can) to conceive.21 This is often true even if the
patient knows he or she has a low chance of success.22 Indeed,
patients are frequently willing to pay nearly $30,000 for a 10%

16. See, e.g., id. at 235 n.1; Anjani Chandra & Elizabeth Hervey Stephen,
Impaired Fecundity in the United States: 1982-1995, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP.
34, 36 (1998); see also CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, AM.
SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED. & SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., 2005
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY
FERTILITY
CLINIC
REPORTS
31
(2007),
AND
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2005/508PDF/2005ART508.pdf [hereinafter 2005
ART REPORT] (describing different causes of infertility among people using
reproductive technologies).
17. See Embryonic Genetic Testing Is Boosting IVF Pregnancies, BIOMED., Nov. 11, 2005, http://www.bio-medicine.org/medicine-news/EmbryonicGenetic-Testing-Is-Boosting-IVF-Pregnancies-5598-1/ (describing reasons why
genetically-at-risk couples may use ART to avoid passing on a genetic
abnormality or disease to their children).
18. See The Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y of Reprod. Med., Sex
Selection and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 72 FERTILITY & STERILITY
595, 595 (1999) (explaining the ART methods that may be used to preselect the
gender of a child).
19. See Debora Spar & Anna Harrington, Selling Stem Cell Science: How
Markets Drive the Law Along the Technological Frontier, 33 AM. J.L. & MED.
541, 553 (2007).
20. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 7, at F6 (indicating the high demand for
donor eggs has pushed prices up).
21. See SPAR, supra note 12, at 4.
22. See Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea
or Paper Tiger?, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 629–31 (1997).
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chance of having a baby.23
In the future, demand is only likely to grow as more and
more women postpone childbearing to have careers24 and
increasing numbers of individuals defy traditional norms of
child-rearing by opting to have children alone or with same-sex
partners.25 Others will turn to reproductive technologies to
avoid passing on genetic abnormalities or disease to their
offspring,26 or even to choose their children’s gender.27
B. THE SUPPLY SIDE
Meanwhile, the supply side is also growing apace,
generating an increasingly high-tech sector where highlytrained physicians and laboratory personnel work in state-ofthe-art clinics. The core technology in this area, IVF, involves
using hormones to induce ovulation in a woman, taking the
eggs produced and combining them with a man’s sperm in a
Petri dish, allowing them to grow for a few days, and then
implanting the resulting embryos in the woman’s uterus.
Similar to IVF, but used much less frequently, are gamete
intrafallopian transfer (“GIFT”) and zygote intrafallopian
transfer (“ZIFT”), which involve, respectively, placing the eggs
and sperm directly in the fallopian tubes and putting a zygote
(early stage embryo) into the fallopian tubes.28
Intracytoplasmic sperm injection (“ICSI”), meanwhile,
23. Melinda B. Henne et al., The Combined Effect of Age and Basal
Follicle-Stimulating Hormone on the Cost of a
Live Birth at Assisted Reproductive Technology, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY
104, 107 (2008).
24. See Linda J. Heffner, Advanced Maternal Age—How Old is Too Old?
351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1927, 1927 (2004). Heffner explains:
The past decade has seen a remarkable shift in the demographics of
childbearing in the United States. The number of first births per
1000 women 35 to 39 years of age increased by 36 percent between
1991 and 2001, and the rate among women 40 to 44 years of age
leaped by a remarkable 70 percent. In 2002, 263 births were reported
in women between 50 and 54 years of age.
25. See Linda Villarosa, Once-Invisible Sperm Donors Get to Meet the
Family, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2002, at F5 (indicating that single mothers and
lesbians are a growing clientele at sperm banks).
26. See Embryonic Genetic Testing Is Boosting IVF Pregnancies, supra
note 17.
27. See Denise Grady, Girl or Boy? As Fertility Technology Advances, So
Does an Ethical Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at F5.
28. 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 16, at 39 (describing that GIFT and
ZIFT are used infrequently, comprising 0.1% and 0.2% of ART procedures
respectively).
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which was developed as a treatment for male infertility,
involves the direct insertion of an individual sperm into the
ovum. First used successfully in Belgium in 1992, ICSI today
accounts for 60% of IVF procedures and is increasingly used
even when there is no male-factor infertility.29
Other related technologies have increased the options
available on the supply side, including cryopreservation (egg or
embryo freezing), egg donation, and surrogacy.30 In 2005,
frozen non-donor embryos comprised 15.3 percent, or 20,657, of
the ART cycles performed in the United States, while frozen
donor embryos accounted for 4.1 percent, or 5,541, of the
cycles.31 Donor eggs were used in 12 percent of all cycles—
mostly, we can presume, for older women whose own eggs were
less healthy.32 Surrogacy, by contrast, which was used in only
one percent of ART cycles in 2005,33 is a method preferred by
women who can produce eggs but not carry a pregnancy to term
and by gay men who want to have a genetically related child.
Finally, in embryo adoption, a slightly less expensive option,
couples donate leftover embryos to other infertile couples.34
C. THE MARKET
When one combines the supply side, which is being driven
largely though not entirely by technological developments, with
the demand side, which has arguably existed since time
immemorial, the result is a market.35 In ten years, from 1996
to 2005, the number of ART cycles performed in the United
States more than doubled, as did the number of babies born
from the process.36 Figures from 2005 indicate that there were
134,260 cycles of IVF37 in that year with an average cost of
$12,400 for one IVF cycle and 38,910 live births that resulted
from IVF.38 In addition, Americans spent over $80 million on
29. See id. at 39–41.
30. See id. at 54.
31. See id. at 14.
32. See id. at 56.
33. See id. at 52.
34. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Some See New Route to Adoption in Clinics
Full of Frozen Embryos, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2001, § 1, at 1.
35. See generally SPAR, supra note 12, at 1–30.
36. 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 16, at 61.
37. See id. at 12.
38. See id.; American Society of Reproductive Medicine, Frequently Asked
Questions about Infertility, http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html#Q6 (last
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16,161 transfers of donor eggs,39 at an average cost of $3,000 to
$5,000 per “harvest.”40 Some small portion of these eggs—
known colloquially as “Ivy League” or “designer” eggs—fetched
in the range of $25,000 to $50,000.41 Sperm, by contrast,
generally sold for $200–$300.42
Adding these figures together to estimate the total market
size is difficult. However, if the figures for 2005 showing IVF
averaging roughly $12,400 per cycle hold true, the arithmetic
suggests that assisted reproduction in the United States is at
least a $1.7 billion market before even considering sperm sales,
high-end eggs, legal fees, surrogacy, or adoption. Admittedly,
this is not a huge market. Global revenues for bottled water,
by way of comparison, are $100 billion,43 with nearly $15 billion
in the United States alone in 2006.44 However, the baby
market is still a very real market and most certainly a
commercial enterprise. Furthermore, it is a unique and
important market because of what is being bought and sold: the
promise of a child.
visited Oct. 31, 2008); see also Henne et al., supra note 23, at 106 (indicating
that the cost of a fresh cycle in the U.S. in 2005 was between $10,803 and
$15,317); Mary Duenwald, After 25 Years, New Ideas in the Prenatal Test
Tube, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2003, at F5 (estimating IVF costs between $10,000
and $15,000 per cycle).
39. 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 16, at 56 (arriving at the $80 million
figure for spending on donor eggs by multiplying the number of donor egg
cycles by an estimated average cost of $5,000 per egg).
40. See Sharon N. Covington & William E. Gibbons, What is Happening
to the Price of Eggs?, 87 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1001, 1002 (2007) (stating that
the average compensation of egg donors, based on a survey of clinics, was
$4,216, ranging from a low of $1,500 to a high of $15,000); Carlene Hempel,
Golden Eggs, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Jun. 25, 2006, at 19 (stating that some
egg donors receive $5,000 for their first donation); see also ASRM Guidelines
for Oocyte Donor Compensation, supra note 14, at 308 (recommending
compensation between $5,000 and $10,000).
41. See Covington & Gibbons, supra note 40, at 1001; Gina Kolata,
$50,000 Offered to Tall, Smart Egg Donor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1999, at A10;
see also Dreifus, supra note 13, at F5.
42. SPAR, supra note 12, at 37.
43. EMILY ARNOLD & JANET LARSEN, EARTH POLICY INST., BOTTLED
Water: Pouring Resources Down the Drain (2006), http://www.earthpolicy.org/Updates/2006/Update51.htm; see also Tom Standage, Op-Ed., Take
it Straight from the Tap, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at A15.
44. Charles Fishman, Message in a Bottle, FAST COMPANY MAG. (2007),
available at http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/117/features-message-ina-bottle.html; see also Allison Van Dusen, Health in a Bottle?, FORBES, Apr.
30,
2007,
http://www.forbes.com/health/2007/04/28/water-health-bottledforbeslife-cx_avd_0430bottled.html (spending on bottled water was $10 billion
in 2005).
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As noted earlier, however, most people in this market do
not like to dwell or even comment upon its commercial side.
Orphaned children are never sold (either legally or
linguistically). Instead, they are matched with their “forever”
families.45 Sperm and eggs are “donated” even when they cost
tens of thousands of dollars,46 and surrogate mothers lend their
wombs to help infertile couples.47
However, the semantics in this area do not transform the
underlying reality. When parents purchase eggs or sperm,
when they contract with surrogates, when they choose a child
to adopt or an embryo to transfer, they are doing business.
Intermediaries are making money in all of these transactions,
and children are being acquired and exchanged through market
mechanisms.
Furthermore, the law is unquestionably being shaped by
semantics as well. As one court pointed out, “semantical
distinctions are significant in this context, because language
defines legal status and can limit legal rights.”48 Consider
Massachusetts, for example, where it is criminal to sell
embryos or gametes for research, but perfectly legal to “donate”
them for reproductive purposes.49
45. Cf. Laura Mansnerus, A Lucrative Industry Booms on the Side, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 1998, at A16 (“As the adoption industry grows . . .
peripheral services have multiplied.”).
46. See Gina Kolata, Clinics Selling Embryos Made for ‘Adoption’, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 1997, § 1, at 1; see also ASRM Guidelines for Oocyte Donor
Compensation, supra note 14, at 306. The ASRM guidelines state:
Compensation based on a reasonable assessment of the time,
inconvenience, and discomfort associated with oocyte retrieval can
and should be distinguished from payment for the oocytes themselves.
Payment based on such an assessment is also consistent with
employment and other situations in which individuals are
compensated for activities demanding time, stress, physical effort,
and risk.
47. Krittivas Mukherjee, Rent-a-Womb in India Fuels Surrogate
Motherhood
Debate,
REUTERS,
Feb.
5,
2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/inDepthNews/idUSDEL29873520070205.
48. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tenn. 1992).
49. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111L, § 8 (LexisNexis 2008). The law states:
[n]o person shall knowingly and for valuable consideration purchase,
sell, transfer or otherwise obtain human embryos, gametes or
cadaveric tissue for research purposes. Nothing in this section shall
prohibit a person from banking or donating their gametes for personal
future use, or from donating their gametes to another person or from
donating their gametes for research. Nothing in this chapter shall
prohibit or regulate the use of in vitro fertilization for reproductive
purposes.
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As people—as parents—we do not like to think of children
as economic or legal objects, or to consider ourselves as paying
for something that is truly priceless. As the legal scholar
Margaret Jane Radin has argued, “Conceiving of any child in
market rhetoric wrongs personhood.”50 What we argue is that
we have to acknowledge the deeply commercial nature of
assisted reproduction. Because if we do not acknowledge its
commercial nature and instead treat this realm as a purely
private, intimate, and emotional endeavor, we risk making
serious policy mistakes.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE “BABY BUSINESS”
After describing the market for reproductive technologies,
we now describe six major problems that emanate from the
current state of the baby market. These are price, inequity,
the absence of property rights, identity, health risks, and
potential societal costs.
A. PRICE
Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of the baby business
is the high cost of assisted reproductive services. Indeed, ART
has become a big business in the United States precisely
because it costs so much.51 Each cycle costs more than
$10,000,52 and it frequently takes multiple cycles to achieve
pregnancy, with success rates decreasing with each try.53
Studies have found that the average cost per successful
delivery for IVF ranges between $66,667 for the first cycle to
$114,286 by the sixth.54 In this market, however, average costs
do not tell us too much, since success rates vary so widely by
patient-specific factors, especially age.55 For women with low
success rates (below 10 percent or 15 percent) for example, the
cost of producing a baby goes up to well over $100,000

50. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1849, 1927 (1987).
51. See Henne et. al., supra note 23, at 104.
52. Id. at 106.
53. 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 16, at 36–37.
54. See e.g., Peter J. Neumann et al., The Cost of a Successful Delivery
with in Vitro Fertilization, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 239, 239–43 (1994).
55. See Bradley J. Van Voorhis, In Vitro Fertilization, 356 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 379, 380 (2008) (“The effect of a woman’s age on the outcomes of IVF
with her own eggs is striking.”).
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(depending on the price per cycle).56 Costs per cycle are also
higher when a donor egg is used, because, as noted above,
donated eggs generally cost between $3,000 and $5,000. An
average cycle with a donor egg is then estimated to cost
between $15,000 and $25,000, meaning that the cost per live
birth (using a 51 percent success rate) runs between $29,411
and $49,020.57
B. INEQUITY
Inevitably, such high costs result in inequity, since only a
fortunate few can afford to spend $50,000, much less $100,000,
in order to have a chance at a baby.58 Many couples are forced
out of the baby business from the outset, and many more find
themselves burdened by the huge expenses they accumulate on
the way to parenthood or exhaustion. While some non-profit
groups like the InterNational Council for Infertility
Information Dissemination (INCIID) are tackling the issue of
inequity by providing IVF scholarships for those in need and
others like RESOLVE are fighting for more expansive
insurance coverage, ART in the United States remains largely
the province of the rich, or at least the well-to-do.
Poor,
infertile people suffer twice as a result, first from the inability
to conceive for free and then from the unaffordability of
assisted reproduction.
Theoretically, this kind of inherent inequity could be
deemed unconstitutional if the right to procreate is protected
by the Constitution. To date, the Supreme Court has not
directly addressed the right to procreate by IVF.59 However, in
a case about the right to the use of contraceptives, the Court
has indicated that the right to procreate (or not to) is protected:
“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
56. Henne, supra note 23.
57. Id. at 109 (estimating cost of donor egg cycle based on Internet
search). Cycles with donor eggs, on average, have higher success rates (about
50%) which are not dependent on the age of the woman undergoing IVF. Van
Voorhis, supra note 55, at 382.
58. See Tarun Jain & Mark D. Hornstein, To Pay or Not to Pay, 80
FERTILITY & STERILITY 27, 27 (2003) (“Because of this high out-of-pocket cost,
many financially constrained infertile couples are excluded from access to this
care.”).
59. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992).
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affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
Such statements have led scholars like John
child.”60
Robertson to conclude that there may be a constitutionally
protected right to procreate and that this right may extend to
the use of new reproductive technologies.61
To be sure, a right to procreate does not necessarily
translate into a right to have the cost of reproductive
technologies covered by the state. For example, in Maher v.
Roe, the Supreme Court held that the right to an abortion did
not include the right to state funding for it.62 The Court wrote:
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to pay the
pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to
pay any of the medical expenses of indigents . . . . An indigent
woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a
consequence of Connecticut’s decision to fund childbirth; she
continues as before to be dependent on private sources for the service
she desires. The State may have made childbirth a more attractive
alternative, thereby influencing the woman’s decision, but it has
imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already
there. The indigency that may make it difficult—and in some cases,
perhaps, impossible—for some women to have abortions is neither
created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation.63

Still, even if the costs of ART are not deemed worthy of
state funding, the current inequities in this market seem well
worthy of state concern.
Meanwhile, rather than addressing these inequities, the
current system of insurance coverage in the United States
actually serves to exacerbate them.64 At the time of this
60. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
61. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of
Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 428–29 (1983).
Robertson states:
There is a strong argument that married persons do have a right to
engage in noncoital, collaborative arrangements to overcome
infertility.
An infertile couple’s interest in genetic continuity, in
gestating and giving birth, and in rearing the offspring is identical to
the interest of a fertile couple . . . . An interpretation extending the
right to procreate to noncoital and collaborative reproduction will
have significant practical effects.
It will give fertile or infertile
married persons the legal right (subject, of course, to regulations that
serve compelling state interests) to make reproduction a collaborative
enterprise. This right will include the ability to contract with others
for their sperm, ovum, uterus, or child and the ability to forge an
agreement for assigning the entitlements and duties that affect the
child.
62. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
63. Id. at 469, 474.
64. See JESSICA ARONS, FUTURE CHOICES ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
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writing, only fourteen states required some form of coverage of
ART.65 Of these states, moreover, only twelve require coverage
of infertility services, while the remaining two only require that
insurance companies offer coverage.66 Further, of the twelve
states that mandate coverage, only ten mandate coverage of
IVF.67 California and New York, for example, explicitly allow
IVF to be excluded from coverage,68 and New York further
limits coverage to women who are on Medicaid, uninsured, or
have purchased individual insurance policies.69 California and
Connecticut laws, along with those of several other states,
allow religious employers to exempt coverage of infertility
services not consistent with their beliefs.70 In addition, Hawaii
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 8 (2007) (“For most people then, having health
insurance coverage of some or all infertility treatments may make the
difference between accessing those services or not.”); see also Jain &
Hornstein, supra note 58, at 29 (“Nationally mandated health insurance
coverage for infertility services, including IVF, will provide equal access and
care to all couples with infertility.”).
65. The fourteen states which cover infertility services include Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, and West Virginia. AM.
SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., STATE INFERTILITY INSURANCE LAWS (2008),
http://www.asrm.org/Patients/insur.html; INT’L COUNCIL ON INFERTILITY
INFO.
DISSEMINATION, STATES MANDATING INFERTILITY INSURANCE
COVERAGE (2004), http://inciid.org/article.php?id=275. For a good summary of
the state laws on infertility, see ARONS, supra note 64, at 8–11.
66. See ARONS, supra note 64, at 10.
67. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LAWS
RELATED TO INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR INFERTILITY TREATMENT (Oct. 2008),
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/50infert.htm.
68. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6(a) (West 2005) (“On and after January
1, 1990, every insurer issuing, renewing, or amending a policy of disability
insurance which covers hospital, medical, or surgical expenses on a group
basis shall offer coverage of infertility treatment, except in vitro fertilization .
. . .”); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3221(k)(6)(C)(v) (McKinney Supp. 2008) (“Coverage
shall not be required to include the diagnosis and treatment of infertility in
connection with: (I) in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian tube transfers
or zygote intrafallopian tube transfers . . . .”); NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, supra note 69.
69. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 3221; Richard Pérez-Peña, State Will Require
Coverage of Treatment for Infertility, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2002, at B4.
70. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6(d) (“Nothing in this section shall be
construed to require any employer that is a religious organization to offer
coverage for forms of treatment of infertility in a manner inconsistent with the
religious organization’s religious and ethical principles.”); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 38a-509(c)(1) (West 2007) (“Any insurance company, hospital or
medical service corporation, or health care center may issue to a religious
employer an individual health insurance policy that excludes coverage for
methods of diagnosis and treatment of infertility that are contrary to the
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provides for a one-time only IVF benefit with conditions,
including that the wife’s eggs must be fertilized by her
husband’s sperm and that the couple must have a five-year
history of infertility.71 Coverage is therefore sketchy at best,
even in those states that offer it in some form. This despite a
1995 study estimating that covering infertility would only raise
annual insurance premiums for all subscribers by about three
dollars per month.72
C. ABSENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Another major problem plaguing the baby business is the
absence of property rights, especially with respect to the
disposition of frozen embryos created by a married couple that
later separates or divorces, or where one or both spouses dies.73
This section discusses case law and statutes that address
property rights with respect to embryos.74
Courts have been the refuge of last resort in this area,
called upon to answer such questions as whether a woman
should be allowed to implant or donate embryos made with her
eggs and her ex-husband’s sperm against his will. At first
glance, contract law seems like an easy solution, allowing a
couple to decide what should happen to their embryos in the
event of divorce. However, courts have ruled differently
concerning contracts for the disposition of embryos, reflecting
an absence of agreed-upon standards.
In the 1992 case of Davis v. Davis,75 the first case
regarding rights to excess embryos, the Supreme Court of
religious employer’s bona fide religious tenets.”); see also ARONS, supra note
64, at 9, 42 n.45 (seven states’ laws contain an exemption for religious
organizations).
71. HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (Supp. 2007).
72. Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and
Options, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 1215, 1219 (1997).
73. See, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1055 (Mass. 2000) (“While
IVF has been available for over two decades and has been the focus of much
academic commentary, there is little law on the enforceability of agreements
concerning the disposition of frozen preembryos.”).
74. Property rights involving embryos is the major issue in the field.
There are clearly other issues like the rights of gamete donors and surrogacy
donors that will not be addressed in detail here. For example, some states
provide that oocyte donors are not legal parents. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 554 (West 2007). In addition, courts in a number of states have
addressed surrogacy contracts.
See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790
(Mass. 1998); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
75. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
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Tennessee held that Junior Davis’s right not to have genetic
children outweighed the rights of his ex-wife to donate their
embryos.76 When the couple divorced, Mary Sue Davis initially
sought to have the frozen embryos implanted to become
pregnant; by the time the case reached the state’s high court,
however, she was remarried and wanted to donate them.77 Her
ex-husband Junior, however, opposed both uses of the seven
frozen embryos left in storage at the Knoxville Fertility
Clinic.78 The couple did not have a contract beforehand, nor did
Tennessee have a relevant statute.79 There was likewise no
case law to guide the court.80 The court first decided that
preembryos were not persons, nor were they property; rather,
they were entitled to “special respect because of their potential
for human life.”81 The court then determined that contracts on
such matters are enforceable.82
Since Davis, however, other courts have come out
differently on whether related contracts are enforceable.83 In
Kass v. Kass,84 for example, the New York Court of Appeals
held that Maureen and Steven Kass’s contract providing for
donating embryos for research was controlling, even though
Maureen sought to use them to achieve pregnancy after the

76. Id. at 604. The Davis court stated that courts should look to the
wishes of the man and woman first, then any prior agreement, before
engaging in an interest-balancing test to determine the disposition of embryos.
See id.; see also J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 717, 720 (N.J. 2001) (finding that
the wife’s right not to procreate outweighed the husband’s right to use their
frozen embryos, and that the seven frozen embryos should be destroyed).
77. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589–90.
78. Id. at 590.
79. Id. at 590, 592. The court noted that Louisiana was the only state
that had a statute that addressed the disposition of frozen embryos, stating
that they could not be intentionally destroyed and that property right disputes
should be resolved in the “best interest” of the frozen embryo. Id. at 590 n.1.
80. Id. at 590 & n.2.
81. Id. at 597.
82. See id.
83. Compare Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175, 181 (N.Y. 1998), and
Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 54–55 (Tex. App. 2006) (upholding an
agreement between the a couple providing for discarding their unused
embryos in the event of a divorce), with A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1056
(Mass. 2000) (holding that the consent form only defined “the donors’
relationship as a unit with the clinic” and was not a binding agreement
between them in the event of a disagreement as to the disposition of the frozen
preembryos).
84. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 174.
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couple’s divorce.85 Two years later in 2000, however, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held a contract
regarding embryo disposition unenforceable; the contract
provided that in the event of a separation, the wife could
implant the leftover embryos.86 While the court found the
contract unenforceable on several grounds, it also stated,
crucially, that, even if the contract were a valid one, “we would
not enforce an agreement that would compel one donor to
become a parent against his or her will.”87 Courts so far are
unwilling to enforce contracts that result in a person
procreating against his or her will.
Other states, meanwhile, have passed laws that
specifically address the disposition of embryos.88 In 1986, for
example, Louisiana passed legislation stating that “[a]n in vitro
fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person,” meaning it
has the right to sue and be sued, that it is a separate entity
from the medical facility it is stored at, and it is not property of
the man or woman whose gametes created it.89 A Florida
statute enacted in 1993, by contrast, requires a written
85. See id. at 180 (“Agreements between progenitors, or gamete donors,
regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes should generally be presumed valid
and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them. Indeed, parties
should be encouraged in advance, before embarking on IVF and
cryopreservation, to think through possible contingencies and carefully specify
their wishes in writing.”) (citations omitted); see also Roman, 193 S.W.3d at
54–55; Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 271 (Wash. 2002) (upholding a
contract which provided that cryopreserved embryos be destroyed five years
after their creation)..
86. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1054, 1056.
87. See id. at 1056–58. The court stated that “forced procreation is not
an area amenable to judicial enforcement.”
88. Indeed, in one case, the court wrote that it anticipated “that the issue
will ultimately be resolved by the Texas Legislature.” Roman, 193 S.W.3d at
44 & n.6.
89. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:123–126 (2008). Section 9:126 of the
statute provides:
An in vitro fertilized human ovum is a biological human being which
is not the property of the physician which acts as an agent of
fertilization, or the facility which employs him or the donors of the
sperm and ovum. If the in vitro fertilization patients express their
identity, then their rights as parents as provided under the Louisiana
Civil Code will be preserved. If the in vitro fertilization patients fail
to express their identity, then the physician shall be deemed to be
temporary guardian of the in vitro fertilized human ovum until
adoptive implantation can occur. A court in the parish where the in
vitro fertilized ovum is located may appoint a curator, upon motion of
the in vitro fertilization patients, their heirs, or physicians who
caused in vitro fertilization to be performed, to protect the in vitro
fertilized human ovum’s rights.
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agreement providing for the disposition of eggs, sperm, and
preembryos in the event of divorce, death, or other unforeseen
circumstances.90
At the moment, therefore, there is little consensus in the
United States about the legal status of the embryo. The reason
for this gap is obvious—any national attempt to define the
embryo would run headlong into the perilous debate over
abortion. Yet in the absence of such a conversation, business is
being conducted without any underlying agreement about
property rights, and courts are forced to make Solomonic
decisions without the benefits of an underlying law.
D. IDENTITY
The great benefit of assisted reproduction technology is
that it has allowed millions of people to become parents in new
ways, combining their own genetic material with that of
donors. One of the main problems created as a result, however,
is that the children who result from these technologies often
have no knowledge, or only partial knowledge, of their genetic
origins. And as these children age into adulthood, it appears
that they, like legions of adopted children before them, are
eager to learn of their genetic origins and angry that this
information is denied them. Or as Katrina Clark, born of
sperm donation, wrote in the Washington Post:
The children born of these transactions are people, too . . . . I’m
here to tell you that emotionally, many of us are not keeping up. We
didn’t ask to be born into this situation, with its limitations and
confusion. It’s hypocritical of parents and medical professionals to
assume that biological roots won’t matter to the “products” of the
cryobanks’ service, when the longing for a biological relationship is
what brings customers to the banks in the first place. We offspring
are recognizing the right that was stripped from us at birth—the
right to know who both our parents are . . . . That was when the
emptiness came over me. I realized that I am, in a sense, a freak. I
really, truly would never have a dad. I finally understood what it
meant to be donor-conceived, and I hated it.91

Katrina’s situation speaks to more than a personal longing
for identity. It raises the key issue of rights: the right to
personal information; the right to medical information; and the
90. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2005).
91. Katrina Clark, Who’s Your Daddy?: Mine Was an Anonymous Sperm
Donor. That Made Me Mad. So I Decided to Find Him., WASH. POST, Dec.
17, 2006, at B1–B5.
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right, perhaps, to a father. Under the current system of
assisted reproduction, the rights of the prospective parent
predominate. Parents contract for the services they desire, and
providers essentially treat them as a delicate hybrid of patient
and customer. What is lost in this equation is the product—the
child—that results. Do these children have any rights that
trump those of their parents? Can they demand access to their
genetic parents’ medical information? Can they track their
genetic siblings and ensure, at a minimum, that they do not
procreate with them? At the moment, the law offers few
answers. Yet as these children grow in number and age, they
will demand, as they should, some form of redress.
E. HEALTH RISKS
Although the health risks of assisted reproduction are
apparently minimal, there has nevertheless been a conspicuous
dearth of studies examining the risks to mothers, egg donors,
and children.92 Part of the reason for this gap may simply be
time: ART has only been around, after all, for thirty years.93
Yet one study from 2002 found that children conceived with
ICSI and IVF were more than twice as likely as normallyconceived children to have a major birth defect.94 Another
92. See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION
RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 175–76,
194
(2004),
available
at
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/reproductionandresponsibility/_pcbe_final_re
production_and_responsibility.pdf (calling for long-term study of the health
effects).
93. See id. at 38 (noting that the oldest person conceived from assisted
reproductive technologies is in her mid-twenties); Van Voorhis, supra note 55,
at 383 (“Epidemiologic studies to date have been limited in many cases by
small samples and by the fact that most women who have undergone IVF have
not yet reached the age of peak cancer incidence; nevertheless, these studies
have generally been reassuring.”).
94. Michèle Hansen et al., The Risk of Major Birth Defects after
Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection and in Vitro Fertilization, 346 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 725, 729 (2002) (“The increase in the risk of a major birth defect
associated with assisted conception remained significant when only singleton
or term singleton infants were considered, as well as after adjustment for
maternal age and parity, the sex of the infant, and correlation between
siblings.”); see also Allen A. Mitchell, Infertility Treatment—More Risks and
Challenges, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 769, 769 (2002). Mitchell writes:
The use of assisted reproductive technology appears roughly to double
the risk of having a term singleton with low birth weight or a child
with a major birth defect. However, the majority of couples who
require assistance with reproduction will not be affected, since
according to these studies, the likelihood of having a term singleton

AND
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found they were twice as likely to have a low-birth weight.95
Studies have also shown that ovarian stimulation—of both
egg donors and IVF patients—can occasionally result in a
dangerous form of hyperstimulation that, in very rare cases,
can lead to death.96 Questions also lurk regarding the effect of
egg donation on the donor’s fertility and on possible links to
breast or gynecological cancers.97 Egg donors may even be at
increased risk for infertility as a result of the hormones and
procedures.98
Moreover, even if ART itself does not heighten the risk of
birth defects, ART as it is currently practiced leads to a large
increase in multiple pregnancies, which incontrovertibly
contributes to dangerous pregnancies and higher-risk births.99
In traditional pregnancies, multiple births occur about 3
percent of the time.100 By contrast, ART procedures as recently
as 2005 led to a more than 30 percent incidence of twins or
higher-order births.101 The causation is clear. Because women
(and perhaps their doctors) are anxious for a given cycle of
infant of normal birth weight is about 94 percent, and the likelihood
of having an infant who is free of major defects is about 91 percent.
95. Laura A. Schieve et al., Low and Very Low Birth Weight in Infants
Conceived with Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 346 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 731, 731, 734 (2002).
96. Rabin, supra note 7. But see Van Voorhis, supra note 55, at 383:
[t]he ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome is a short-term consequence
of gonadotropin stimulation and early pregnancy. This syndrome,
which occurs in less than 5% of IVF cycles, consists of ovarian
swelling, pelvic pain, and hemodynamic fluid shifts, often
accompanied by ascites. The disorder almost always resolves after
several weeks, although in rare cases, death due to thromboembolism
has been reported.
97. See Mary Anne Rossing et al., Ovarian Tumors in a Cohort of Infertile
Women, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 771, 771 (1994); Hempel, supra note 40, at 21;
Rabin, supra note 7; RUTH FARRELL ET AL., GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR.,
IVF,
EGG
DONATION,
AND
WOMEN’S
HEALTH
4–5
(2006),
http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/IVF_Egg_Donation_Womens_Health_final.
pdf; see also Debora Spar, The Egg Trade—Making Sense of the Market for
Human Oocytes, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1289, 1290 (2007) (calling for longterm studies of the effect of ovarian stimulation on egg donors).
98. See ASRM Guidelines for Oocyte Donor Compensation, supra note 14.
99. See Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Contribution of Assisted
Reproductive Technology and Ovulation-Inducing Drugs to Triplet and HigherOrder Multiple Birth—United States, 1980–1997, 49 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY.
REP.
535,
535–38
(2000),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm4924.pdf.
100. 2005 ART Report, supra note 16, at 22.
101. Id.
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treatment to lead to a live birth, multiple embryos are often
implanted at the same time.102 Indeed, in 2005, more than 47
percent of IVF cycles performed in the United States involved
the implantation of three or more embryos.103
In many of these cases, some or all of the embryos failed to
develop either into fetuses or live children. Yet, ironically,
when multiple embryo transfer is successful, in the sense that
all the embryos survive, it also poses stark health risks for
these embryos, including premature birth, low-birth weight,
and an increased likelihood of birth defects or even death.104
Well aware of these risks, the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) recommends that its members
not transfer more than two embryos to any woman under the
age of thirty-five.105 The law in this area, however, remains
mute, and there is no legal penalty for doctors who choose to
ignore the ASRM’s recommendations.
F. POTENTIAL COSTS TO SOCIETY
Currently, convention holds that the costs of assisted
reproduction are entirely private: prospective parents pay out
of pocket for what they want and can afford.
In many
instances, though, the costs of their decisions are also being
borne by the rest of us, through such channels as higher labor
and delivery costs (for complicated pregnancies), higher
neonatal costs (for babies born prematurely as a result of
multiple pregnancies), and possibly even higher educational
costs as children who were born prematurely or at belownormal weights enter the public school system.106 The average
cost of treating a premature infant, for example, is $58,000—a
sum that is now simply absorbed by hospitals or insurance
companies and rolled into the escalating costs of health care.107
102. See id. at 45.
103. Id. at 44.
104. Id. at 22–23 (premature birth); id. at 24 (low-birth weight). But see
id. at 70 (indicating that the percentage of multiple births conceived as a
result of assisted reproduction has decreased over the past ten years).
105. Practice Comm. of the Soc’y for Assisted Reprod. Tech. & the
Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Guidelines on Number of
Embryos Transferred, 86 FERTILITY & STERILITY S51, S51 (2006).
106. See Jane E. Allen, Puzzling Rise in Early Births, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
20, 2003, at F1.
107. See id.; see also Antoinette Martin, Multiple Births: A Wake-up Call,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1996, at C1 (noting that thirty-five percent of the cost is
borne by Medicare and Medicaid); cf. Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive
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This cost is well above the $4,300 typically required to cover
the costs of a newborn.108 Premature births are also on the
rise: in 2005, 12.7 percent of births were preterm, an increase
of 9 percent over 2000 and 20 percent since 1990.109 Over the
longer term, meanwhile, if it turns out that the use of
hormones in reproductive technologies leads to a heightened
risk of certain cancers or a higher incidence of next-generation
infertility, these costs, too, will become part of the nation’s
ongoing health care burden.
Other potential costs of ART are social rather than
financial. Both egg donors and surrogates, for instance, are
frequently women of limited means who agree to “help couples
create a family” in exchange for relatively large sums of
Do these commercial relationships constitute
money.110
exploitation? Though it is hard to say for sure, feminist
The basic facts of both
scholars certainly think so.111
Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA.
L. REV. 603, 626 (2003) (“Fertility clinics do not absorb the additional
expenses incurred with multifetal pregnancies, which can be substantial,
while they would lose business if their pregnancy success rates declined
significantly.”).
108. Tim Bonfield, March of Dimes Targeting Early Births, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER,
Feb.
3,
2003,
available
at
http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2003/02/03/loc_marchofdimes03.html.
109. Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2005, 56 NAT’L VITAL
STAT.
REP.
1,
3,
20
(2007),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_06.pdf.
110. See ASRM Guidelines for Oocyte Donor Compensation, supra note 14
(“Both monetary compensation and oocyte sharing create the possibility of
undue inducement and exploitation in the oocyte donation process. Women
may agree to provide oocytes in response to financial need.”); Krittivas
Mukherjee, Rent-a-Womb in India Fuels Surrogate Motherhood Debate,
Feb.
5,
2007,
REUTERS,
http://www.reuters.com/article/inDepthNews/idUSDEL29873520070205
(calling surrogacy an “exploitation of the poor by the rich”).
111. See GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 2 (1985) (“Just as the
patriarchal state now finds it acceptable to market parts of a woman’s body
(breast, vagina, buttocks) for sexual purposes in prostitution and the larger
sex industry, so it will soon find it reasonable to market other parts of a
woman (womb, ovaries, egg) for reproductive purposes.”); JANICE G.
RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS 81 (1993). She writes:
Most so-called surrogates arrive in court from a background of
economic disadvantage or dead-endedness . . . . A legal recognition
of male dominance, thus a legal recognition of the ways in which
women have been channeled into surrogacy and motherhood at any
cost to themselves, is a necessary legal precondition to women’s
equality. Rights are related to actual social relations, and it is maledominant relations that are definitive in the legal area—the man’s
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relationships are clear. Egg donation is neither easy nor
pleasant: the procedure involves using hormones to induce
ovulation and extracting eggs for use in IVF. It can cause
pain, bloating, diarrhea, and nausea.
Yet egg agencies
sometimes receive hundreds of applications each month,112 and
feature hundreds of women who receive, on average, about
$5,000 for their labors.113 Most of these donors fit a common
profile, coming, as one recent news article reported, from:
“[C]ollege towns, where the perfect specimens—young, SAT–tested
women deep in debt—can be recruited through school newspaper ads,
websites like craigslist, and photocopied fliers stapled to trees. The
ads probably won’t mention the medical and psychological screenings.
Or the injections of hormones. Or the suctioning. They will mention
families in need. And they will promise cash.”114

Meanwhile, the price of a surrogate is so high in the United
States (around $50,000) that some couples are turning to
women in less developed countries like India, where wombs can
“For the
be rented for as little as $10,000–$12,000.115
surrogates—usually lower middleclass housewives—money is
the primary motivator.”116 One such woman, Jyoti Dave,
rented her womb to provide food for her family after her
husband lost his limbs in an accident.117
Reasonable people can likely disagree about the societal
costs of such arrangements. However, practices like egg
relation to his sperm, his money, his wife, and the women who may
serve as surrogate wives, that is, as surrogate breeders.
Julie Murphy, Egg Farming and Women’s Future, in TEST-TUBE WOMEN:
WHAT FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? 68, 73 (Rita Arditti et al. eds., 1989)
(“Through egg farming, women can be divided into two groups: egg donors and
embryo recipients . . . . Two reproductive classes of women can degrade
women as ‘parts’ of ‘reproductive bodies’ and diminish our chances of obtaining
reproductive rights for all women.”).
112. Rene Almeling, Selling Genes, Selling Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm
Banks, and the Medical Market in Genetic Material, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 319,
326, 328 (2007) (noting that a particular egg agency received more than a
hundred applications per day, and both agencies studied reject more than
eighty percent of the applications); The Egg Donor Program, Welcome to the
Egg
Donor
Program,
http://www.eggdonation.com/recipientparents/RecipientParents.php (last visited Oct. 4, 2008) (indicating that the
agency receives more than 400 applications per month).
113. See, e.g., Egg Donation, Inc., http://www.eggdonor.com (last visited
Oct. 4, 2008) (stating that their egg donor database contains more than 600 of
the “most exceptional and diverse” donors).
114. Hempel, supra note 40, at 19–20.
115. Mukherjee, supra note 110.
116. Id.
117. Id.

SPAR.HARRINGTON.WEB

62

2/20/2009 12:13:31 PM

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 10:1

donation and surrogacy should, at a minimum, not be seen
simply as the commercial or personal decisions of private
individuals.
Instead, insofar as they touch upon social
concerns—concerns about exploitation, or commodification, or
the sale of women’s bodies—they need to be embedded in a
broader discussion about societal costs and benefits.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR POLICY AND LEGAL CHANGE
Frequently, participants in the baby business will argue
that there is nothing that can, or should, be done to address
these problems, either because the problems (like the absence
of property rights or inequity) are too intractable, or because
any legislative solutions could well bring about an even worse
state of affairs.118 Some people worry about the politicization of
medical decisions or about the consequences of any open debate
on the legal status of the embryo.119 Others believe that
private regulation has succeeded thus far.120
From the outside, meanwhile, some critics argue that the
entire area of assisted reproduction is morally wrong and that,
in the words of the Protestant ethicist Paul Ramsey, “[m]en
ought not to play God before they learn to be men, and after
they have learned to be men they will not play God.”121
We respectfully disagree with these objections because
there are policies that could be put in place to govern the baby
business—policies that would not eliminate the trade or even
unduly constrain it, but would make it work better for all of the
parties involved: parents, doctors, donors, and most
importantly, the children who are conceived through assisted
reproduction and the society that receives them. This section
presents some specific recommendations along these lines.
A. PROVIDE PATIENTS, EGG DONORS, AND SURROGATES WITH
118. See generally Daar, supra note 22.
119. See George J. Annas & Sherman Elias, Politics, Morals and Embryos:
Can Bioethics in the U.S. Rise Above Politics? 431 NATURE 19, 19–20 (2004);
see also JANE MAIENSCHEIN, WHOSE VIEW OF LIFE? 5 (2003) (“Our political
acceptance of this technology shows that our society has a range of reasonable
views of when a life actually begins. The problem is how to accommodate all
these different and competing views.”).
120. Rick Weiss, Fertility Innovation or Exploitation?, WASH. POST, Feb. 9,
1998, at A1.
121. PAUL RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN: THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL
138 (1970).
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ACCESSIBLE AND RELIABLE INFORMATION
This first recommendation is straightforward and should,
in our opinion, be non-controversial. It is simply to demand
that all providers in the baby business supply their patients
with basic information regarding the risks of any procedures
they are planning to undergo; the relevant success rates (i.e.,
not the average rates of IVF success over all ages if the patient
is forty-two, but the rates of success for forty-two-year-olds);122
and the estimated costs. Ideally, patients also need to be
The 1992
informed about all their available options.123
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act (FCSRCA)
went a long way toward reaching this policy objective, but we
need to go further still.124 Under FCSRCA, clinics report their
data by type of procedure (IVF, GIFT, ZIFT), by cause of
infertility, by age (younger than 35, 35–37, 38–40, 41–42), and
by type of cycle (using fresh or frozen non-donor or fresh or
frozen donor eggs).125 What FCSRCA lacks, however, is any
mechanism for prodding clinics to share their information
directly with patients and, more importantly, any means of
penalizing those clinics that do not report.
Massachusetts provides a good example of how a state can
use legislation to address such concerns. Since the 2005
passage of “An Act Enhancing Regenerative Medicine in the
Commonwealth,” the Massachusetts Department of Public
Health must provide physicians and other health care
providers with documents to supply their infertility patients
who undergo in vitro. These include:
an informational pamphlet, describing the procedure by which an egg
is extracted from the patient, including all short and long-term
potential health impacts of the procedure on the patient, any drugs or
devices to be used, including whether they have received approval
from the United States Food and Drug Administration, the risks
involved, any discomfort and side effects that may be experienced,
any alternatives which the patient may have and their attendant
risks and benefits, medical treatment available to the patient should
122. See 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 16, at 26–27 (indicating declining
success rates as age increases).
123. See Daar, supra note 22, at 630 (“Patient understanding about the
techniques of treatment are [sic] at odds with their expectations of such
treatment, one possible consequence may be inappropriate or over utilization
of fertility therapy.”).
124. See, e.g., Reporting of Pregnancy Success Rates From Assisted
Reproductive Technology Programs, 65 Fed. Reg. 53,310, 53,312 (Sept. 1,
2000).
125. 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 16, at 78.
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complications arise, and that the particular treatment may involve
currently unforeseeable risks to the patient, embryo or fetus. A
physician or other health care provider treating a woman with a
procedure by which an egg is intended to be extracted shall provide
the patient with this pamphlet or a legible copy thereof, and provide
any other treatment information which may be specific to the
patient’s treatment . . . .126

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention seems to
agree with the Massachusetts approach, noting recently that
consumers in search of fertility treatment would like more
Women in
information than they currently receive.127
particular need to be more aware of the age-specific success
rates of treatment, since age remains the single most important
factor in determining a woman’s likelihood of achieving a
successful pregnancy.128 A forty-year-old woman using her own
eggs, for example, has a 23 percent chance of becoming
pregnant in a given cycle of IVF, and a 16 percent chance of
giving birth to a live child.129 A forty-five-year old woman, by
contrast, has only a 2.5 percent chance of pregnancy and less
than a 1 percent chance of a live birth.130 Women of all ages,
moreover, need to understand how success rates vary by clinic
and why an apparently low success rate could actually indicate
that a particular clinic is agreeing to work with higher-risk
patients, rather than boosting its statistics by only accepting
those patients who are most likely to conceive.131
It is therefore paramount that clinics provide patients with
all of the relevant information, and that government entities
play a small but crucial role in prompting clinics to comply.132
126. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111L, § 4(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005). The statute
also requires informed consent. § 4(a)(2).
127. Reporting of Pregnancy Success Rates from Assisted Reproductive
Technology Programs, 65 Fed. Reg. at 53,312 (2000). It notes:
[i]ndeed, many providers and consumers have asked us to collect and
report even more information than is currently included in the
reporting system. Many providers have expressed concern that
without consideration for many patient treatment factors the report
will misrepresent clinic success rates. Of course, consumers are also
very interested in a thorough and complete analysis, which will help
in their goal of making an informed decision about ART.
128. 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 16, at 26–27, 30.
129. Id. at 27.
130. Id.
131. See Gina Kolata, Fertility, Inc.: Clinics Race to Lure Clients, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at F1.
132. See Daar, supra note 22, at 629 (stating that if a “patient[‘s]
understanding about the techniques of treatment are [sic] at odds with their
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B. PERFORM STUDIES OF THE LONG-TERM RISK OF ART
In addition to providing patients with the information that
is currently available about IVF and other treatments, we also
need to encourage the generation of further information about
the long-term risks of ART—to mothers and egg donors and
children—and then to reduce these risks as much as
possible.133 For instance, it appears that male children born
from ICSI, a very popular procedure in which a single sperm is
injected directly into the egg, have higher than average levels
of infertility and certain types of cancer.134 Some studies have
also suggested that there are possibly long-term effects from
hormone exposure including breast, ovarian, and even uterine
cancer.135 As more and more women are exposed to these
hormones, and as the children born from IVF-induced
pregnancies reach adulthood and their own child-bearing years,
we need to ensure that any possible long-term risks of IVF
treatment are well tracked and studied.
In the meantime, we already know that the greatest risk to
a pregnant mother or in utero child is a multiple pregnancy.136
Fifty percent of twins are born prematurely, as are 90 percent
of triplets and nearly all higher-order births.137 Twins are six
times more likely to suffer from cerebral palsy, and triplets are
twenty times more likely.138 One out of every fifteen twins dies
before their first birthday, as does one of every five triplets.139
expectations of such treatment, one possible consequence may be
inappropriate or over utilization of fertility therapy”).
133. See supra notes 92–105 and accompanying text; see also PRESIDENT’S
COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 92, at 194 (calling for more long-term
study of ART); cf. Mitchell, supra note 94 (stating that two studies that were
published in 2002 “will help infertile couples to evaluate the risks they and
their offspring might face if they choose to use assisted reproductive
technology”).
134. Jennifer J. Kurinzuk, Safety Issues in Assisted Reproduction, 18 HUM.
REPROD.
925,
927
(2003),
available
at
http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/18/5/925?maxtoshow=&HITS=10
&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=1&title=ICSI&andorexacttitle=and&andorexac
ttitleabs=and&fulltext=cancer&andorexactfulltext=and&searchid=1&FIRSTI
NDEX=0&sortspec=relevance&resourcetype=HWCIT.
135. See Helen Pearson, Health Effects of Egg Donation May Take Decades
to Emerge, 442 NATURE 607, 607–08 (2006).
136. See supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
137. AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., PATIENT FACT SHEET: COMPLICATIONS
OF
MULTIPLE
GESTATION
(2008),
http://www.asrm.org/Patients/FactSheets/complications_multiplebirths.pdf.
138. LIZA MUNDY, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE 217 (2007).
139. See id.
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As a result of these risks, emerging regulation in Europe
prohibits doctors from transferring more than two embryos at a
time and strongly recommends single embryo transfer (“SET”).
In the United States, by contrast, there are only private
guidelines issued by the ASRM, 140 and there is no mechanism
to ensure long-term studies of the effects of fertility treatments
on both the women who receive them and the children born as
a result.
C. ESTABLISH A FORMAL SYSTEM FOR RECORDING DONOR
IDENTITIES
Our third recommendation is to establish a formal system
for recording the identities of egg, sperm, and embryo donors.
Currently we are making precisely the same mistake with
children born of ART that we did with earlier generations of
adopted children.141 Specifically, we are presuming that these
children will not want to know their genetic origins. Yet much
of the evidence—both from the world of adoption and from the
first generation of children (now adults) born of donated
sperm—suggests precisely the opposite.142 Individuals want to
know from whom they came. They may not want to maintain
any kind of emotional relationship with their birth mother,
with their sperm donor, or with the woman who provided the
egg from which they sprang, but they want to know, and we as
a society owe it to them to provide that information.
Increasingly, sperm banks are starting to move toward
tracking donor contact information.143 In 1983, the Sperm
Bank of California in Berkeley became the first to institute
“donor identification release,” which allows offspring, upon
turning eighteen, to contact the sperm bank to receive donor
information.144 Other sperm banks have subsequently followed
suit, and some have moved even more aggressively to enable
offspring to contact their donors.145 Furthermore, after a
fifteen-year-old boy conceived from sperm donation tracked
140. Practice Comm. of the Soc’y for Assisted Reprod. Tech. & the
Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 105.
141. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Peggy Orenstein, Looking for a Donor to Call Dad, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 28.
143. See Villarosa, supra note 25.
144. See id.
145. See id.
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down his father after paying FamilyTreeDNA.com $289 for
genetic matching services, it is not clear how long donor
anonymity can be guaranteed anyway.146 Recognizing these
problems, the United Kingdom has recently passed legislation
enabling offspring who are eighteen years or older to contact
gamete donors,147 and Australia’s National Health and Medical
Research Council has adopted ethical guidelines mandating
open donation.148 In the United States, similar requirements
may well cause the price of sperm to rise, since fewer men are
interested in being “known donors.”149 Given the desperation of
many donor children to know their genetic origins, however, it
seems a price well worth paying.150
146. See Alison Motluk, Tracing Dad Online; One Teenager’s Detective
Work has Shown that Promises of Anonymity for Sperm Donors may now be
Worthless, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 5, 2005, at 6.
147. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of
Donor Information) Regulations, 2004, S.I.
1511, Reg. 2, ¶ 3 (U.K.)
(requiring that the Authority provide adult donor-conceived applicants with
information as to the donor identity provided by donors to clinics after March
31, 2005). See generally Olga Craig, Where Have All the Donors Gone?,
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 30, 2006, at 21 (describing a severe
shortage of sperm donors in the U.K. as a result of the new legislation
eliminating donors’ anonymity); Mark Henderson, Sperm Donor Figures
Rising Despite Loss of Anonymity, TIMES (London), May 4, 2007, at 32,
(describing an increase in the number of sperm donors in the U.K. since the
passage of the new legislation); Making Babies: Will a New UK Law Stop
People From Donating Eggs and Sperm?, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 12, 2005, at 3
[hereinafter Making Babies] (discussing the potential chilling effect of the new
legislation on gamete donation).
148. AUSTL. HEALTH ETHICS COMM., NAT’L HEALTH & MED. RES COUNCIL,
ETHICAL GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
IN
CLINICAL
PRACTICE
AND
RESEARCH
16
(2004),
http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/publications/synopses/_files/e56.pdf
(“Persons
conceived using ART procedures are entitled to know their genetic parents.
Clinics must not use donated gametes in reproduction procedures unless the
donor has consented to the release of identifying information about himself or
herself to the persons conceived using his or her gametes.”). See generally
June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies, Regulation, and Trust:
Building Ethical Understandings into the Market for Fertility Services, 9 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 509, 538–42 (2006) (comparing Australian and U.S.
fertility services laws and discussing a shortage in sperm donors in Australia
since the enactment of open donation guidelines); Carly Crawford, Desperate
Couples Buy Sperm Online, N. TERRITORY NEWS (Australia), July 16, 2007, at
7 (describing a trend of Australian couples buying sperm from anonymous
online donors since the enactment of open donation guidelines); Barbie Dutter,
Australian Sperm Donors Get Right to Contact Offspring, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
(London), July 2, 2006, at 31.
149. See Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 148, at 517; cf. Craig, supra note
147; Making Babies, supra note 147.
150. Cf. Amy Harmon, supra note 11.
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D. TREAT ART AS A MEDICAL SERVICE COVERED BY INSURANCE
Our final recommendation is the most complicated, since it
involves engaging with the delicate and uncomfortable balance
between the costs and benefits of assisted reproduction. If we
in the United States truly want to address the inequities
described earlier, we could move closer to the European model,
treating infertility as a medical condition and incorporating it
into our health care system.
Such an inclusion would,
admittedly, be expensive.
It would also, perhaps more
critically, force us to define what kinds of fertility treatments
make sense, just as we already define which cancer treatments
or hip replacement surgeries make sense in any given case.151
In practice, bringing insurance companies or other impersonal
providers into the equation would force a distinction between
cases of infertility, for example, between the twenty-sevenyear-old wife with blocked fallopian tubes, who would most
likely qualify for several cycles of IVF treatment, and the single
fifty-three-year old recovering cocaine addict and ex-felon, who
would not.152 Moreover, insurance coverage could provide teeth
to certain standards, mandating that coverage be provided only
for clinics that report according to federal law or adhere strictly
to professional guidelines.153 Coverage could also be structured
to disallow or to provide disincentives for risky procedures such
as multiple embryo transfer.154
Most critically, bringing the admittedly harsh calculus of

151. See supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text; see also Henne, supra
note 23, at 104 (“In countries where ART services are included in national
health care plans, the economic implications of the increased use of ART
services make it imperative to determine which couples are likely to benefit
from these services to judiciously allocate resources.”).
153. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a–509(b)(6) (West 2007) (permitting
insurance companies to require “infertility treatment or procedures be
performed at facilities that conform to the standards and guidelines developed
by the American Society of Reproductive Medicine or the Society of
Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility.”); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 431:10A116.5(a)(6) (Supp. 2007) (mandating coverage only for IVF procedures
“performed at medical facilities that conform to the American College of
Obstetric and Gynecology guidelines for in vitro fertilization clinics or to the
American Society for Reproductive Medicine minimal standards for programs
of in vitro fertilization.”).
154. See Meredith A. Reynolds et al., Does Insurance Coverage Decrease
the Risk for Multiple Births Associated with Assisted Reproductive
Technology?, 80 FERTILITY & STERILITY 16, 17–21 (2003).
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costs and benefits into the baby trade would allow us to launch
a broader discussion about the societal impact of this trade. It
would encourage us to debate where and under what
circumstances we, as a society, want to subsidize a person’s
ability to procreate and where and under what (presumably
very small) circumstances we do not. It would also provide for
us a means of bringing the interests of the child into a process
that is now oddly parent-focused and to consider the public
costs of a uniquely private endeavor.
IV. CONCLUSION
Once we recognize that the baby business is, indeed, a
business, it becomes easier to see where important policy
choices are necessary and where the intimacy of private
decisions must nevertheless leave room for the public policies
that address the societal implications of those decisions. In
particular, assisted reproduction raises concerns related to the
safety of women and children; to the identity of conceived
children; to the equity with which various individuals have
access to treatment, and thus to the potential to parent. None
of these concerns are, in actuality, particularly difficult to
address through policy channels. Safety risks, for example, can
be mitigated by providing complete and mandatory information
to all egg donors and IVF patients and by requiring better
record keeping and follow-up studies of both women and
children affected by assisted reproduction. Identity issues
could be easily (although perhaps somewhat more painfully)
addressed by establishing donor registries and by allowing the
adult children of donor conception to access information on
their genetic parents. Finally, even the intractable-sounding
issue of equity could be addressed by providing insurance
coverage for some well-defined set of fertility treatments and by
incorporating the option of adoption into the equation as well.
Like its more natural counterpart, assisted reproduction
will always remain a private realm, marked by massively
personal decisions and intimate, sometimes tragic results. Yet
the private nature of procreation does not rob it of its social
implications or, in the case of assisted reproduction, of its
decidedly commercial nature. Accordingly, public policy in the
United States needs to approach this new market with open
eyes, recognizing it for what it is, and implementing regulation
that allows it to evolve along the safest, kindest, and most
beneficial path.

